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Introduc tion
For more than 30 years, the United States has included in all of its newly negotiated
income tax treaties a limitation-on-benefits (lob) article intended to prevent (or at
least limit) treaty shopping by residents of third countries. In fact, over the past two
decades, one of the priorities of the us tax treaty program has been to renegotiate
existing treaties in order to add a lob provision. From the us perspective, treaty
shopping that allows “residents of countries other than the countries that are parties
to the treaty to derive treaty benefits (such as rate reductions on passive income) by
channeling investments through entities organized in or resident in a treaty jurisdiction)” violates the principle that tax treaties represent a deal negotiated between
two sovereign states.1

* Director, Graduate Program in Taxation, University of Miami School of Law (e-mail:
pbrown@law.miami.edu).
1 Testimony of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), United States Department of
the Treasury, before the House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs, April 13, 1983: “We believe that an income tax
treaty is a contract between two countries designed to benefit directly the residents of the two
countries and not indirectly residents of third countries.”
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Although treaty shopping has been described as constituting tax avoidance,2 the
Treasury Department now views treaty shopping more pragmatically. As long as
residents of third countries can enjoy the benefits of reduced withholding rates by
engaging in treaty shopping, they will not lobby their governments to enter into
treaties that provide reciprocal benefits to us taxpayers.3 Proof that lob provisions
are working can be seen in the fact that countries such as Japan and Canada have,
after many years, agreed to much-desired reductions in withholding rates. The
price of those reductions was time-consuming and difficult negotiations.
As of the time of writing, it appears likely that the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (oecd) will be adding a us-style lob provision to
the oecd model convention4 as part of its base erosion and profit shifting (beps)
project.5 As a result, more countries may begin negotiating lob provisions in the
future.6 Accordingly, it seems to be a suitable time to review the development of
the us lob provision and determine whether it provides useful lessons for the international community.

T r a n s a c t i o n - S p e ci f ic A n t i -T r e at yShopping Rules
It is important to keep in mind that the lob provision is not the only tool used by the
United States to attack the inappropriate use of tax treaties. Other useful doctrines
include substance over form, economic substance, step transaction, and beneficial
ownership. Although these doctrines are more commonly used in domestic circumstances, in 1999 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed their application
in the treaty context.7 A pending treaty-shopping case against Ingersoll Rand suggests that the Internal Revenue Service believes that a particular structure may
implicate a number of these doctrines at the same time. In general, the doctrines are
used to attack particular transactions, while the lob provision is used to attack entities. For example, for the anti-conduit regulations to apply, there must have been a
reduction in withholding rates, which means that some entity must have satisfied
the requirements of the applicable lob provision.
2 Ibid.
3 Statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (tax policy), Department of the Treasury,
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 27, 1993.
4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital: Condensed Version (Paris: OECD, July 2010).
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, BEPS Action 6: Preventing the
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances (Paris: OECD, March 14, 2014).
6 Of course, the negotiation process could be considerably shortened if the OECD is successful
in developing a multilateral process for modifying existing tax treaties. In that case, most
countries would face a steep learning curve in connection with the implementation of such
provisions but not the negotiation of them.
7 United States, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Tax Convention with Italy,” Exec.
Rpt. 106-8, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (November 9, 1999).
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The us Treasury Department has even flirted with a uk-style “main purpose”
test, including it in treaties with Italy and Slovenia that were signed in 1999. When
the treaties were presented to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was harshly critical of the main purpose test.
The committee stated that the “new main purpose tests in the proposed treaty are
subjective, vague and add uncertainty to the treaty.”8 It noted that the main purpose
test was similar to subjective tests that had formed the basis of some earlier antitreaty-shopping provisions. Quoting the Treasury Department’s technical explanation
to the proposed treaty, the committee said that the “fundamental problem presented
by this approach” was that “it is based on the taxpayer’s motives in establishing an
entity in a particular country, which a tax administrator is normally ill-equipped to
identify.” As a result, “[t]hese subjective tests have been replaced in recent treaties
(including the proposed treaty) with limitation on benefits provisions that apply
clear, bright-line objective tests.”9 The Senate entered a reservation to each of the
two treaties requiring the main purpose provisions to be struck before the treaty
could enter into force.10 The committee also made it clear that although it would
consider “appropriate ways to address tax avoidance in the treaty context,” the
Treasury Department would face an uphill battle should it propose any such main
purpose test in future treaties. As a result, even the us treaty with the United Kingdom, which was signed in 2001, did not include the test; instead, the treaty introduced
more targeted rules addressing conduit arrangements. The United States continues
to resist the adoption of a main purpose test in connection with the beps project.11

The De velopment of Objec tive Tests
The oecd received hundreds of pages of comments on its discussion draft on treaty
abuse. Many of the comments suggested that a us-style lob provision is too complicated and called for a simpler provision. Of course, the original provisions used
by the United States to combat treaty shopping were relatively simple. They were
also almost completely ineffective.
The relatively simple one-sentence provisions that were introduced in the early
1960s did not become today’s multi-page LOB extravaganzas overnight. The current
version of the lob provision consists of a series of objective tests. Residents of a
contracting state that satisfy one of the tests essentially are presumed to have a good
8 Ibid., at 5. The committee elaborates on its theme by continuing, “It is unclear how the
provisions are to be applied. In addition, the provisions lack conformity with other U.S. tax
treaties. This uncertainty could create difficulties for legitimate business transactions, and can
hinder a taxpayer’s ability to rely on the treaty.”
9 Ibid., at 5-6.
10 Slovenia promptly accepted the Senate reservation, allowing that treaty to enter into force in
2001. Italy was much slower to accept the reservation, and the US-Italy treaty entered into
force only in 2009.
11	Kristen A. Parillo, “ABA Meeting: Stack Previews Final BEPS Reports,” Tax Notes Today,
May 13, 2014.
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business reason for structuring their activities through that contracting state. Each
new definition or rule has been a response to a particular issue or need of the parties.
Once a provision is introduced in one agreement, it is likely to be replicated—or
expanded—in another agreement. This evolutionary process is interrupted every
decade or so when it becomes clear that the provision has evolved in such a way that
it no longer serves its purpose of preventing treaty shopping.
Several us tax treaties entered into after the Second World War included provisions in the dividend article that denied the benefits of the “direct dividend” rate to
corporations that were established with the purpose of qualifying for that rate.
Those provisions, relying as they did on the subjective intention of the taxpayer in
establishing the entity, were not particularly effective in preventing the use of treaties by residents of third countries.
These provisions were succeeded by a provision directed at “investment or holding companies,” which first appeared in the 1962 us-Luxembourg treaty and was
soon followed by a similar provision in the us-Netherlands treaty as it applied to
the Netherlands Antilles. These more objective provisions initially disqualified entities that were entitled to specified beneficial tax regimes in their state of residence
or that enjoyed a lower level of taxation as a result of “special measures.” Eventually,
even the reference to special measures was dropped, so that the provisions could
apply whenever the tax imposed on the treaty-benefited income was substantially less
than the tax that would be imposed on corporate profits generally. The ownership
test included in such provisions was an additional, not an alternative, requirement
and thus was seldom an issue. The provisions could easily be avoided by ensuring
that the company was subject to the same corporate tax regime as any other company
resident in the jurisdiction (even if that regime included a participation exemption,
allowed extreme thin capitalization, or provided a deduction for dividends).
us faith in the investment or holding companies provision evaporated in early
1981, with the release of the Gordon report on tax havens.12 The report highlighted
abusive structures that did not rely on the existence of “special measures” (which it
equated with a “special rate of tax”). The report’s discussion of holding company
structures demonstrated that the same result could be achieved through reducing
the corporate tax base by allowing high levels of deductible payments. Accordingly,
focusing on ownership and special measures is not enough—base erosion must also
be prevented.
The effect of the Gordon report can be seen in the rapid renegotiation of the
us-Jamaica treaty. The treaty that had been signed on May 21, 1980 included the then
standard investment or holding companies provision. The treaty was transmitted to
the Senate on August 4, 1980; before the Senate could consider it, the treaty was
amended by a protocol signed on July 17, 1981, which included a new “limitation on

12 Richard A. Gordon, “Tax Havens and Their Use by the United States Taxpayers: An Overview:
A Report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney General (Tax
Division), Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy).”
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benefits” provision. This provision included the seeds of what became the “standard”
us lob provision. The main test was an ownership/base erosion test: an entity
could be denied benefits, even if it was owned by residents of a contracting state, if
its income was eroded (and therefore not taxed in its state of residence) through
deductible payments to residents of third states. Thus, the rule responded directly
to the concerns raised in the Gordon report. However, now that every entity had to
satisfy both prongs of the test, proof of ownership became crucial. Because of the
difficulties of proving ownership of a publicly traded company, the us-Jamaica provision presumed that a company in whose stock there was substantial trading in a
contracting state was owned by residents of the contracting state of which the company was a resident.
Because the ownership/base erosion test included in the us-Jamaica protocol was
significantly more effective than the “special measures” provision in earlier treaties,
entities owned by residents of third countries generally did not qualify for treaty
benefits. In many cases, however, there were legitimate business reasons for establishing the entity in the treaty country. This point was recognized through the
introduction of other avenues by which entities that have legitimate business reasons for being resident in a jurisdiction may qualify for treaty benefits.
Two important concepts thus make an appearance in the us-Jamaica provision
in the form of guidelines to be followed in applying the catchall second paragraph,
under which an entity qualifies for benefits if it is determined that the entity was not
treaty shopping. If a Jamaican entity is owned by residents of third countries, it
nevertheless qualifies for benefits if the treaty-benefited income is derived in connection with business operations conducted in Jamaica. If the Jamaican entity is
owned by individual residents of third countries who would have been entitled to
substantially similar benefits under us tax conventions, the entity also qualifies for
benefits.
Thus, in less than two years, the main components of the modern lob provisions—
ownership/base erosion, publicly traded companies, active conduct of a trade or
business, and even derivative benefits—evolved from the old investment or holding
companies provision. From 1982 to 1992, there was little change in the US approach
to the lob provisions. There generally was an ownership/base erosion test and an
active trade or business test. The ownership presumption regarding publicly traded
companies soon became a stand-alone rule pursuant to which such companies simply
qualified for benefits without regard to ownership. By 1989, it had become clear
that the determination of an entity’s qualification under the residual rule was within
the discretion of the competent authority of the contracting state providing the
benefits. Over time, rules were added to make it clear that individuals did not have
to meet any of the other tests and to address specific issues relating to governments
and government-owned entities and to tax-exempt entities such as charities and
pension funds. The language of these provisions was tightened over the years, adding much to their length and complexity. However, since each of those changes was
made in response to taxpayer behaviour, it is hard to imagine reverting to simpler
drafting.
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Unlike the other tests in the us-Jamaica protocol, the derivative benefits test fell
out of favour and did not appear again until 1992 in the us-Mexico treaty and, of
course, in the us-Netherlands treaty. In essence, the derivative benefits test is simply an ownership/base erosion test with a much broader universe of “good” owners
and recipients of base-eroding payments. The ownership/base erosion test is limited to certain persons resident in the same contracting state as the entity that
claims benefits.13 Under the derivative benefits test, the entity may qualify even if it
is owned by residents of specified third states and makes payments to residents of
specified third states, as long as those third-country residents would have qualified
for the same benefits had they received the income directly from the source state.
The theory behind the derivative benefits test is that third-country residents are
not treaty shopping if they would have been entitled to the same treaty benefits.
Nevertheless, it is clear that allowing benefits under a derivative benefits test allows
for regime shopping. That is, the treaty-benefited income need not be paid on to
the “equivalent beneficiaries” in the third countries. In many cases, the entity located
in the treaty country that is claiming benefits under the derivative benefits provision
also qualifies for a beneficial regime, so that the treaty-benefited income might not
suffer significant taxation. For example, one of the primary benefits to Canadian
multinationals of the elimination of the withholding tax on interest in the 2007
protocol to the us-Canada treaty is not that interest can be paid straight from us
subsidiaries to Canadian parent companies, but rather that the Canadian multinationals can once again utilize finance subsidiaries in the Netherlands or Ireland
because the subsidiaries will now qualify for benefits under the derivative benefits
provisions of treaties with those countries.

N e x u s a n d t h e P u b l ic ly T r a d e d
Co m pa n y T e s t
For multinational companies, the “publicly traded company” test is by far the best
way to qualify for treaty benefits. If a company meets the requirements of the test,
then all of its income, and the income of its subsidiaries resident in the same country,
qualifies for treaty benefits. Conceptually, the test is harder to understand, since even
the earliest lob provisions allowed trading in either contracting state to qualify a
company under the test. In fact, unlike the other tests in the lob provision, the
publicly traded company test did not require the taxpayer to establish a nexus with
its country of residence. Rather, there seemed to be an assumption that establishing
nexus was not necessary in the case of publicly traded companies because publicly
traded companies do not engage in treaty shopping.14 More pragmatically, the test
13 In earlier treaties, the owners and recipients of such payments could be in either of the two
contracting states. This policy changed with the 2004 protocol to the US-Barbados tax treaty,
negotiated in response to a number of high-profile corporate inversions out of the United States.
14 American Law Institute Report, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation: Proposals
on United States Income Tax Treaties, Hugh J. Ault and David R. Tillinghast, reporters
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1992), at 158.
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ensures that multinational corporations can easily qualify for treaty benefits. Without such a test, the lob provision would be much harder to sell politically.
The importance of the publicly traded company test can be seen in the number
and types of comments received by the oecd with respect to the version of the lob
provision that was included in the public discussion draft. A number of comments
focused on one aspect of the test—the requirement that an entity that is not primarily traded in its country of residence (or, in many cases, within a regional grouping
that includes its country of residence) must have its primary place of management
and control in its country of residence. A common misperception seems to be that
the “primary place of management and control” test was intended to deal with corporate inversion transactions. Although the test was adopted in conjunction with
anti-inversion provisions, its purpose was different. Accordingly, if governments
acceded to the suggestions in the comments, they would in fact facilitate a particularly expensive form of treaty shopping.

The Publicly Traded Company Test Goes Global
Although many Europeans describe the 1992 us-Netherlands treaty as the first us
tax treaty to have a lob provision, it is really only the first that anyone had to worry
about. The treaty was important because it was the first of a series of renegotiated
tax treaties with countries where treaty shopping was widely acknowledged to be a
problem but which also were significant us trading partners and fellow members of
the oecd. It would have been difficult to terminate any of those agreements. By the
end of the 1980s, however, the threat of treaty overrides by Congress had become
sufficiently credible that those countries began to come (reluctantly) to the negotiating table.
The LOB provision in the US-Netherlands treaty has been described as “the most
complicated set of tax treaty provisions ever devised,”15 but in most respects it did
not substantially change the practical effect of the standard provisions in earlier
treaties. However, a more generous publicly traded company test loosened the test’s
already tenuous nexus requirement. The us-Netherlands treaty, like some earlier
treaties, anticipated that the term “recognized stock exchange” would include thirdcountry exchanges. More importantly, by the time the treaty entered into force, it
had been agreed that the term “recognized stock exchange” would include the
principal stock exchanges of Frankfurt, London, Paris, Brussels, Hamburg, Madrid,
Milan, Sydney, Tokyo, and Toronto. New treaties with Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg,
and Switzerland, all considered by the Senate in 1997, similarly include expansive
lists of third-country exchanges.
In its 2007 study addressing inappropriate use of tax treaties and proposed
responses, the Treasury Department provided the following assessment of the development of the publicly traded company test:
15 Testimony of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, October 27, 1993.
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In its original form, the publicly traded test focused on corporations that were regularly traded on the stock markets in their home country and reflected the view that
such corporations likely would not be used by residents of third countries for treaty
shopping purposes. The parameters of the test evolved with changes in the global financial markets. With the growth of regional markets, corporations that are listed on
a stock exchange in their home country nevertheless may have a substantial portion of
their trading volume occur on another exchange in their region. Moreover, the international prominence of the u.s. stock exchanges means that many foreign corporations
are listed and substantially traded on u.s. exchanges. The publicly traded test has been
structured to take into account both home-country trading and also u.s. and regional
third-country trading to reflect the realities of modern global financial markets. However, it has become clear that, in some circumstances, additional nexus between the
corporation and its country of residence is necessary to effect the underlying objective
of the lob provision.16

This well-reasoned explanation of the evolution of the publicly traded company
test unfortunately has relatively little to do with the facts. Presumably, the reference to
“the growth of regional markets” was intended to explain trading tests that included
third-country exchanges. The list of third-country exchanges in the us-Slovenia
treaty, for example, consisted of Frankfurt, London, Paris, and Vienna. One can
imagine that a capital-hungry Slovenian company might go to any of those exchanges to raise capital. However, if the rise of regional financial markets was a
significant factor, one would have expected that more of the treaties entered into in
the 1990s—particularly treaties with countries in Eastern Europe and other emerging markets—would have included such provisions. They do not. By contrast, as
noted above, the treaties with the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Switzerland included as recognized stock exchanges the stock exchanges of Sydney, Tokyo,
and Toronto, which clearly cannot be explained by reference to regional trading.
Accordingly, the inclusion of an expansive list of third-country exchanges serves
mostly as a diagnostic tool for treaty havens.17

16 United States, Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer
Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties (Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury, November
2007), at 80 (herein referred to as “the treaty report”), which was mandated by sections 424
and 806 of Pub. L. no. 108-357, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
17 The US treaties with Denmark and the United Kingdom also included relatively expansive lists
of third-country exchanges. Although these two countries do not fall into the same category as
the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg, there were signs in the 1990s that
Denmark might be trying to compete for that business. See, for example, “Using Denmark as a
Holding Company Jurisdiction” (taxand.com/news/newsletters/Using_Denmark_as_a_Holding
_Company_ Jurisdiction?utm_source=Taxands_Take_September_2010&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=Using_Denmark_as_a_Holding_Company_ Jurisdiction). The United
Kingdom was never an attractive location for a conduit company because the advance
corporation tax, imposed on a company at the time that it paid a dividend, could not be offset
by foreign tax credits. When the advance corporation tax was eliminated with respect to
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The expansion of the publicly traded company test to third-country markets
would not have been problematic if publicly traded companies were not used for
treaty shopping. By 2001, however, it had become clear that such an assumption was
simply incorrect. That realization led to the last major change to the lob provision,
a drastic revision of the publicly traded company test.

Adding Insult to Injury: Treaty Shopping by Inverted Companies
The corporate inversion transactions that became a political issue in the United
States in the early 2000s were not about tax treaties, but the transactions’ success
depended on them. Their purpose was to reduce the overall corporate tax on business operations by removing foreign subsidiaries of us companies from the us tax
net. They also offered the prospect of substantially reducing us corporate tax on
any remaining us operations by stripping income out of the United States. In order
to achieve those two goals, however, an inverting company would have to find a new
home that imposed little or no tax and had a favourable tax treaty with the United
States. Thus, if the injury was leaving the United States for tax reasons, the insult
was using us tax treaties to strip income out of the United States while incurring
minimal withholding taxes.
Inverted companies could satisfy the publicly traded company test under standard lob provisions because such provisions generally did not distinguish between
trading in the two contracting states—trading in the United States was treated as a
nexus to the other contracting state to the same extent as trading in that other state.
This problem was corrected in the 2004 protocol to the us-Barbados tax treaty,
which included a complete rewriting of the lob provision. In particular, the publicly traded company test was modified so that a company can qualify for benefits
only if its principal class of shares is primarily traded on a recognized stock exchange in its country of residence (or, in the case of Barbados, on the other stock
exchanges that made up its regional stock exchange).18
The Need for a New Nexus: Primary Place
of Management and Control
The Treasury Department soon ran into problems when it tried to replicate this
simple solution in other treaties. Other countries wanted to ensure that their resident companies would not be prevented from, or penalized for, raising capital in the
us financial markets.19 A new test for establishing nexus was necessary: accordingly,

dividends paid after April 6, 1999, adding a LOB provision to the US-UK tax treaty was seen
as very important. See the testimony of Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Pending Tax Agreements, March 5, 2003.
18 Trading on a stock exchange in the other contracting state will, however, be taken into account
in determining whether the company meets the numerical trading requirements in order to be
considered “regularly traded.”
19 Treaty report, supra note 16, at 81.
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a “public corporation that does not have sufficient nexus to its residence country
through trading on the stock exchanges in that country must establish nexus
through primary management and control in its residence country.”20 The treaty
report made it clear that this revised publicly traded test, developed in the context
of the 2004 protocol to the us-Netherlands treaty, was about stopping third-country
treaty shoppers.21
Who were these third-country treaty shoppers that had managed to claim benefits despite “the most complicated set of tax treaty provisions ever drafted”? At the
time, relatively few Dutch companies were traded primarily in the United States or
on one of the third-country exchanges listed in the us-Netherlands treaty. Among
the few companies in that category, however, some were clearly treaty shopping.
James Hardie Industries has publicly expressed its treaty-shopping goals. In
2001, the company, which had been in business as a resident of Australia for over a
century, announced that it would be moving to the Netherlands in order to qualify
for the 5 percent withholding rate applicable to dividends paid by its substantial us
subsidiaries to the parent corporation rather than the 15 percent rate that then was
applicable to all dividends under the us-Australia tax treaty. In 2010, the company
moved its corporate domicile to Ireland because it could be more certain of receiving us tax treaty benefits there.22
As the Treasury Department described, the point of the primary place of management and control test was to establish nexus with respect to a particular type of
company—namely, a company that the treaty partner already considered to be a
resident. However, it was a company that, although publicly traded, was not primarily traded in its home markets. It also would not meet the ownership/base erosion
test, usually because it was owned by residents of a third country. It might not meet
the “active conduct of a trade or business” test. What test would prove that the
company had non-tax reasons for being resident in the jurisdiction?
The answer—in the form of the primary place of management and control test—
is that the company (or the group of which the company is the parent) actually must
be run from that country. That is, the country of which the company is claiming to be
a resident must be
the country where the corporation’s executive officers and senior management employees exercise the most day-to-day responsibility for the strategic, financial, and
operational decision making of the corporation, and where the most day-to-day activities necessary for preparing and making those decisions take place.23

20 Ibid.
21 “Given developments in trading patterns, the new publicly traded test better serves the intended
purpose of limiting treaty shopping by third-country residents” (ibid.).
22 See Elisabeth Sexton, “Dust to Dust,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 2009, and
www.ir.jameshardie.com.au/jh/about_us/history.jsp.
23 Treaty report, supra note 16, at 82.
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The us model technical explanation explicitly stated that the primary place of
management and control test is “to be distinguished from the ‘place of effective management’ test which is used in the oecd Model and by many other countries to
establish residence.”24 In part, this statement was prompted by the fact that at the
time the test was developed, a discussion paper had been issued under the auspices
of the oecd that suggested that the “place of effective management” test might be
interpreted to mean the place where meetings of a company’s board of directors are
held.25 In May 2003, while the 2004 protocol with the Netherlands was being negotiated, the Technical Advisory Group (tag) released a formal proposal that would
have incorporated a modified version of this approach in the oecd commentary.26
By 2008, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs provided an alternative view: “Many countries . . . considered that the tag’s proposed interpretation gave undue priority to the
place where the board of directors of a company would meet over the place where
the senior executives of that company would make key management decisions.”27
Even though the oecd’s final conclusions might have been consistent with the
concept behind the primary place of management and control test, there is still a
virtue in adopting a test that is relevant only for the purposes of determining
whether a company is treaty shopping. As noted above, many countries use the
place of effective management as a test for determining corporate residence. Because
the purpose of the test is to establish the residence of a company that is incorporated
in another country (and therefore to establish taxing authority over that company),
the tax authorities have an incentive to interpret the language aggressively and
make the test easy to meet. As described above, that intention is the exact opposite
of the intention behind the primary place of management and control test in US LOB
provisions.

Co n c l u s i o n
A us-style lob test prevents most common forms of treaty shopping, at least when
it is combined with anti-abuse rules aimed at specific transactions. However, it is not
at all clear that the United States has significantly increased the amount of withholding taxes that it collects. Instead, it measures the success of the expanded lob rules
24 United States, Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Model Income
Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, article 22, at 66.
25 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Impact of the Communications
Revolution on the Application of the ‘Place of Effective Management’ as a Tie Breaker Rule, a
discussion paper from the Technical Advisory Group on Monitoring the Application of
Existing Treaty Norms for the Taxation of Business Profits (Paris: OECD, February 8, 2001.)
26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Technical Advisory Group on
Monitoring the Application of Existing Treaty Norms for the Taxation of Business Profits,
Place of Effective Management Concept: Suggestions for Changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention,
discussion draft of May 27, 2003 (Paris: OECD, May 27, 2003), at proposed paragraph 24.3.
27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The 2008 Update to the OECD
Model Tax Convention (Paris: OECD, July 18, 2008), at paragraph 4.
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by the extent to which it achieves its goal of reducing withholding rates in treaties
with important trading partners (such as Japan and Canada) or widens its treaty
network to other countries that may be important sources of investment capital
(such as Israel). The achievement of these goals has required substantial resources:
having even one treaty without a lob provision is almost as bad as having no lob
provisions in any treaty. Accordingly, a country should be very clear about its goals,
and realistic about the difficulty of negotiating lob provisions, before embarking on
an anti-treaty-shopping strategy based primarily on the introduction of a lob provision into its tax treaties.

